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Sustainable use of marine resources, as targeted by Ecosystem-Based Fishery 
Management (EBFM), is a highly ranked policy goal. However, many marine fish 
stocks are still overused, challenging sustainability goals. Reasons for this policy 
failure are disputed and they might be manifold, including economic, institutional, and 
social drivers. We use Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) to empirically determine 
and quantify the importance of interacting ecological, economic, and social drivers in 
a political decision making process, i.e. the setting of annual Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) limits. GAMs allow non linear relationships between response and explanatory 
variables and due to their flexibility have successfully been applied to investigate 
ecosystem dynamics. Here, we use this modeling approach in a novel way to 
quantify social-economic-ecological feed-backs on policy decisions. European 
fisheries policy agreed in most cases to TACs higher than scientifically advised. We 
recorded this deviation for all managed European fish stocks for the time-series 
1987-2013. Additionally, we make use of available time-series of socio-economic and 
ecological variables potentially influencing the decision, including national 
unemployment rates, stock status, economic growth rates, and employment in 
fisheries. We show that political decisions on TACs are not only driven by scientific 
advice on the ecological state of the stock, but that socio-economic variables have a 
significant effect on TACs – however not related to sound scientific advice. We 
conclude that scientific advice for a successful implementation of EBFM will have to 
address socio-economic driving forces more explicitly.  
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Introduction 
The most important instrument in fisheries management is setting total allowable 
catches (TACs). TACs limit the amount of fish that can be caught legally from a 
certain stock in a year. Evidence shows that some countries have implemented a 
quite successful TAC management, for example Iceland and New Zealand (Hilborn, 
2007), where fish stocks have increased and fisheries have become highly profitable 
after the implementation of the management schemes. However, in other regions the 
TAC management failed and fish stocks continue to be overexploited. That is the 
case in the European Union (European Commission, 2009b; Khalilian et al.,2010; 
Quaas et al., 2012). 
The failure of the European TAC management is often traced back to too high TAC 
levels that fail to sufficiently restrict fishing activities (European Commission 2009, 
Greenbook). To explain this failure it is widely assumed that decision-makers (mostly 
politicians) act in favor of their personal short-term interests instead of focusing on 
the long-term benefits of sustainable fishing (Froese, 2011; Mardle and Pascoe, 
2002). Accordingly, they would push towards high TAC levels to increase fishing 
benefits in the short run, at the costs of continued overfishing. For the European 
Common Fisheries Policy, Franchino and Rahming (2003) examine the internal 
structure of the European Council of Ministers for Agriculture and Fisheries and show 
that the ministers, despite their obligation to implement sustainable fishery, are more 
concerned with short-run benefits for the fishery than with environmental issues. In 
addition, the decision-makers’ lack of acceptance of scientific recommendations also 
contributes to the choice of high TAC levels (Daw and Gray, 2005). This discrepancy 
between scientific and political positions is an important aspect when it comes to 
ineffective fisheries management (Delaney and Hastie, 2007). The reason for this 
discrepancy is that the scientific advice considers biological and ecological 
components while the decision-makers focus on socio-economic factors in addition to 
the advice. As a consequence, TACs are set on levels that often considerably 
exceed the scientific advice. 
 
 
Material and methods 
Time series 
Advice to TAC ratio (ATR): We used panel data for 73 fish stocks from European and 
Non-European waters in the Baltic Sea, North Sea and North East Atlantic. These 73 
stocks represent 15 species: cod, haddock, herring, plaice, sole, whiting, anchovy, 
capelin, hake, horse mackerel, mackerel, megrim, Norway pout, saithe, sandeel and 
sprat as well as 7 eco-regions (see Tab 1). For each stock a TAC is set each year. 
The time series of observations run from 1987 to 2013. Data is available for the 
advice, agreed TAC, and eco-region as defined by ICES. The data stem from the 
ICES advice sheets from 2014 (ICES, 2014). The advice sheets are used in the 
preparation of TAC proposals from the European Commission to the European 
Council of Ministers. For the majority of the stocks data is available for the whole 
period. However, in some cases the time series starts later, e.g. because the TAC 
management was not introduced for all stocks at the same time. For each year and 
stock, we calculated the advice to TAC ratio (ATR), resulting in a ratio of 1 when the 
scientific advice is followed by politics, and values <1 in cases when politically agreed 
TAC is higher than scientifically advised. Values of 0 indicate an agreed TAC, even if 
the scientific advice was zero catch (Tab. 1).  
Advice to TAC difference (ATD): For the GAM analysis we used the difference 
between advised TAC and agreed TAC in tons.   
Stock status indicator: The (perceived) stock status might influence the political 
decision making. Politicians might accept higher than advised TACs, if the stock is 
perceived to be in good condition. To account for this, we calculated a simple stock 
status indicator: The indicator measures the deviation between estimated total stock 
biomass in a given year as compared to long-term (1987-2013) mean total stock 
biomass.   
 
Additionally, we collected a number of socio-economic time-series, which potentially 
reflect factors influencing the political decision making process. We always focused 
on the country with the highest TAC share of the stock in question. 
Fish consumption: We calculated the per capita consumption of fish (kg/year), 
excluding shellfish and crustaceans. The data are derived from FAO 12/2014.  
Fisheries Employment and Employment rate: Employment gives the total number of 
men and woman, aged 15-64, being employed in the fishing sector (EUROSTAT, 
12/2014). Employment rate gives the % of people working in the fishing sector 
(EUROSTAT 01/2015).  
Unemployment rate: This variable refers to the total unemployment rate, given as a 
yearly average in %, (EUROSTAT 12/2014). 
Economic growth rate: Economic growth rate gives the percental change of total 
economic growth as compared to the base year of 2005 (EUROSTAT 12/2014). 
Number of countries: We also included a variable giving the number of countries, 
which are fishing for a certain stock. 
 
GAM analysis 
Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) were used to identify factors affecting the 
political decision making (i.e. the deviation from scientific advice). A GAM is a non-
parametric regression model blending properties of multiple regressions (a special 
case of general linear model) with additive models. In a GAM the parameter terms 
ajXji of multiple regression are replaced with smooth functions fj(Xji). The advantage 
of using smoothers is that one does not need to specify the form of the relationships 
between the response and the covariate, the data tell us the shape of that function. 
Prior to the analysis ATD and total stock status were logged transformed. 
In the first step, all variables were initially included as covariates in an additive GAM 
model. The Generalized Cross Validation (GCV, Wood 2000) was used as the 
criterion for model selection: all combinations of covariates were tested, potentially 
excluding non-significant (p >0.05) covariates and minimizing the GCV. The GCV is a 
measure of predictive error of the model and thus takes into account not only the fit, 
but also the model complexity. It therefore does penalize excessively complex 
models as a result of greater prediction error. All analyses were conducted using the 
R-software (version 3.2.1), and the package “mgcv” (1.8-6). 
In a second step, we tested for the explanatory power of socio-economic variables 
when the stock-size effect was controlled for. We took the ratio between the ATD and 
the total stock biomass. The models were re-evaluated following the procedure 
described above.  
 
 
Results 
Political implementation of scientific recommendations 
In most cases agreed TACs exceeded the scientific recommendations. Averaged 
over all stocks, highest deviations between advice and implemented TAC occurred in 
the combined eco-region “Bay of Biscay and the Iberian Coast” (Fig. 1a). Here, 
agreed TACs were on average 164% higher than the scientific advice. Lowest 
average values were recorded in the Baltic as well as for the “Widely ranging” stocks. 
These average values might, however, be misleading. When focused on the three 
economically most important stocks within each eco-region, highest deviation are 
found in the Baltic, followed by the Bay of Biscay / Iberian waters eco-region (Fig. 1b). 
The agreed TAC was within 90-110% of the scientifically advised TAC in 41% of the 
cases (Fig. 2). Remaining variability between stocks inside a single eco-region as 
well as within a stock is high (Tab. 1). In 6 out of 7 eco-regions TACs were agreed, 
although the scientific advice was to close the fishery. On the other hand, for single 
stocks TACs were set far below the scientific advice for maximum catches, e.g. Baltic 
plaice in sub-divisions 21-23.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. “Political overfishing”. Mean deviation of agreed TAC to scientifically advised TAC in 
the period 1987-2013, by ICES eco-region. Left: all species within eco-region; right: 3 
economically most important species. Size of the grey silhouette symbolizes the scientific 
advice, red silhouettes symbolize politically agreed TAC. 
 
Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of scientific advice to politically agreed TACs. Values < 1 
indicate political overfishing, values >1 indicate TACs set below scientifically acceptable 
limits.  
 
Tab. 1. Stock-specific deviation of agreed TAC to scientifically advised TAC, divided by ICES 
eco-region. Given are the mean, standard deviation (STDV), maximum value (MAX), 
minimum value (Min), as well as the median for the period 1987-2013. 
 
EcoRegion Stock Mean STDV Max Min Median 
Baltic cod-­‐2224	   0.582	   0.362	   1.04	   0.04	   0.48	  
Baltic cod-­‐2532	   0.495	   0.368	   1.01	   0.00	   0.46	  
Baltic her-­‐2532-­‐gor	   0.734	   0.340	   1.30	   0.20	   0.70	  
Baltic her-­‐30	   0.742	   0.227	   1.10	   0.38	   0.74	  
Baltic her-­‐31	   0.065	   0.048	   0.17	   0.02	   0.05	  
Baltic her-­‐3a22	   0.987	   0.202	   1.43	   0.71	   0.95	  
Baltic her-­‐riga	   0.916	   0.082	   1.01	   0.76	   0.92	  
Baltic ple-­‐2123	   4.375	   1.020	   6.13	   1.59	   4.23	  
Baltic ple-­‐skag	   1.152	   0.214	   1.77	   0.98	   1.06	  
Baltic sol-­‐kask	   0.904	   0.155	   1.20	   0.59	   0.94	  
Baltic spr-­‐2232	   0.802	   0.244	   1.13	   0.41	   0.82	  
Baltic spr-­‐kask	   0.542	   0.409	   1.00	   0.16	   0.41	  
 	   0.98	   1.02	   6.13	   0	   0.86	  
 	        
NBS cap-­‐bars	   0.993	   0.053	   1.11	   0.76	   1.00	  
NBS cod-­‐arct	   0.881	   0.219	   1.18	   0.28	   0.94	  
NBS cod-­‐coas	   0.098	   0.185	   0.55	   0.00	   0.00	  
NBS had-­‐arct	   0.894	   0.154	   1.19	   0.56	   0.92	  
NBS had-­‐iceg	   0.977	   0.145	   1.34	   0.60	   1.00	  
  0.86	   0.30	   1.34	   0	   1.00	  
  	   	   	   	   	  
BoB ane-­‐bisc	   0.597	   0.497	   1.58	   0.00	   0.48	  
BoB ane-­‐pore	   0.556	   0.079	   0.61	   0.35	   0.59	  
BoB hke-­‐soth	   0.497	   0.407	   1.16	   0.00	   0.54	  
BoB hom-­‐soth	   0.745	   0.181	   1.00	   0.43	   0.80	  
BoB mgb-­‐8c9a	   0.394	   0.406	   1.03	   0.00	   0.32	  
BoB sol-­‐bisc	   0.918	   0.153	   1.27	   0.56	   0.93	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   0.61	   0.37	   1.58	   0	   0.65	  
       
Celtic cod-­‐7e-­‐k	   0.452	   0.292	   1.00	   0.00	   0.42	  
Celtic cod-­‐iris	   0.425	   0.430	   1.00	   0.00	   0.43	  
Celtic cod-­‐scow	   0.455	   0.452	   1.00	   0.00	   0.46	  
Celtic had-­‐7b-­‐k	   0.804	   0.115	   0.88	   0.67	   0.80	  
Celtic had-­‐iris	   0.859	   0.399	   1.40	   0.15	   0.84	  
Celtic had-­‐rock	   1.024	   0.887	   1.54	   0.00	   1.02	  
Celtic her-­‐irls	   0.944	   0.203	   1.29	   0.47	   0.95	  
Celtic her-­‐irlw	   0.948	   0.244	   1.29	   0.00	   1.00	  
Celtic her-­‐nirs	   0.894	   0.113	   1.02	   0.71	   0.92	  
Celtic meg-­‐4a6a	   0.562	   0.152	   0.88	   0.32	   0.58	  
Celtic meg-­‐rock	   0.794	   0.305	   1.11	   0.05	   0.80	  
Celtic ple-­‐7h-­‐k	   0.653	   0.072	   0.77	   0.58	   0.64	  
Celtic ple-­‐celt	   0.801	   0.206	   1.00	   0.38	   0.85	  
Celtic ple-­‐iris	   1.315	   0.832	   3.67	   0.30	   1.00	  
Celtic sol-­‐7h-­‐k	   0.602	   0.181	   0.92	   0.44	   0.53	  
Celtic sol-­‐celt	   0.926	   0.073	   1.04	   0.79	   0.93	  
Celtic sol-­‐iris	   0.723	   0.375	   1.04	   0.00	   0.88	  
Celtic whg-­‐47d	   0.652	   0.176	   1.07	   0.40	   0.64	  
Celtic whg-­‐scow	   0.586	   0.475	   1.31	   0.00	   0.68	  
	   	   0.77	   0.44	   3.67	   0.00	   0.86	  
       
Iceland cap-­‐icel	   0.658	   0.749	   3.60	   0.00	   0.67	  
Iceland cod-­‐iceg	   0.948	   0.089	   1.17	   0.75	   0.97	  
Iceland had-­‐iceg	   0.956	   0.096	   1.20	   0.73	   0.93	  
Iceland her-­‐vasu	   0.981	   0.212	   1.88	   0.64	   1.00	  
	   	   0.89	   0.40	   3.60	   0	   0.94	  
       
North Sea cod-­‐347d	   0.646	   0.681	   2.60	   0.00	   0.68	  
North Sea cod-­‐3	   0.852	   1.679	   6.88	   0.00	   0.78	  
North Sea cod-­‐4	   0.550	   0.517	   1.17	   0.00	   0.60	  
North Sea cod-­‐7d	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	  
North Sea had-­‐34	   0.767	   0.324	   1.28	   0.06	   0.82	  
North Sea had-­‐3	   0.710	   0.255	   1.00	   0.40	   0.65	  
North Sea had-­‐4	   0.686	   0.470	   1.39	   0.00	   0.84	  
North Sea had-­‐6a	   0.860	   0.320	   1.88	   0.43	   0.79	  
North Sea her-­‐47d3	   0.962	   0.076	   1.02	   0.79	   0.99	  
North Sea her-­‐noss	   0.890	   0.316	   1.30	   0.00	   1.00	  
North Sea her-­‐vian	   0.874	   0.247	   1.37	   0.35	   0.91	  
North Sea nop-­‐34	   1.655	   1.513	   3.74	   0.00	   1.42	  
North Sea ple-­‐ech-­‐comb	   0.813	   0.222	   1.00	   0.07	   0.82	  
North Sea ple-­‐nsea	   0.888	   0.125	   1.04	   0.59	   0.92	  
North Sea sai-­‐3a46	   0.928	   0.203	   1.10	   0.00	   0.97	  
North Sea sai-­‐3a4	   0.989	   0.072	   1.14	   0.74	   1.00	  
North Sea sai-­‐6	   0.878	   0.185	   1.12	   0.44	   0.93	  
North Sea san-­‐nsea	   38.231	   64.837	   113.10	   0.57	   38.23	  
North Sea sol-­‐eche	   0.953	   0.117	   1.34	   0.76	   0.99	  
North Sea sol-­‐echw	   0.787	   0.306	   1.08	   0.00	   0.93	  
North Sea sol-­‐nsea	   0.913	   0.101	   1.05	   0.67	   0.93	  
North Sea spr-­‐ech	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	   n.a.	  
North Sea whg-­‐4	   0.831	   0.383	   1.82	   0.00	   0.83	  
North Sea whg-­‐7d	   0.371	   0.293	   0.87	   0.00	   0.29	  
North Sea whg-­‐7e-­‐k	   0.498	   0.175	   0.87	   0.27	   0.50	  
 	   0.83	   0.49	   6.88	   0	   0.93	  
  	   	   	   	   	  
Widely ranging hke-­‐noth	   0.813	   0.179	   1.00	   0.35	   0.85	  
Widely ranging hke-­‐soth	   1.411	   2.390	   11.53	   0.47	   0.97	  
Widely ranging hom-­‐soth	   0.853	   0.156	   1.05	   0.57	   0.88	  
Widely ranging whb-­‐comb	   1.083	   1.156	   4.54	   0.53	   0.77	  
 	   1.04	   1.37	   11.53	   0.35	   0.88	  
 
GAM analysis 
 
In the first GAM (model including stock size) three variables were retained in the final 
model formulation: stock size, number of countries, and fish consumption. This 
confirms that TAC setting is influenced by combined socio-ecological variables. Stock 
status, however, was rejected as insignificant variable. All retained variables had a 
significant (p < 0.001) effect on the deviation between advised and agreed TACs 
(ATD). The model accounted for 64.4% of the variance. Increase in stock biomass as 
well as number of countries had a positive, slightly concave effect on ATD (Fig. 3a-b), 
whereas the effect of fish consumption followed a s-type relationship (Fig. 3c). An 
increase in stock biomass had the strongest, increasingly positive effect. Number of 
countries significantly increased the deviation between advised and agreed TAC 
(ATD) if more than 5 countries were involved in the fishery For per capita fish 
consumption values greater than 28 kg/year increased ATD.   
In summary, the additive model, including stock size, suggest that the highest values 
of political overfishing, i.e. deviations between advised and agreed TACs, occurred 
when a stock is large, many countries are involved in the fishery, and when fish is an 
important part of the diet in society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Partial effects of socio-ecological-economic factors in the first Generalized additive 
model (GAM) including stock size explaining the deviation between advised and agreed 
TACs. The solid lines represent the estimated smooth function and the dashed lines the 
corresponding 95% confidence limits. The rug plots along the x-axis show the values of the 
covariates for each smooth and the number in each y-axis caption is the effective degrees of 
freedom of each term. From left to right and from top to bottom: total stock biomass (panel a), 
number of countries (b), per capita fish consumption (c, kg/year).  
 
To further elaborate the effect of socio-economic factors, we controlled for stock size, 
and re-run the analysis. Three socio-economic variables were retained in the final 
model. As before, “number of countries” and “fish consumption” were statistically 
highly significant (p<0.001). Additionally we found an effect of the unemployment rate 
(p<0.001), which was not revealed before. The model still described 12.5% of the 
variance. A moderately high number of countries involved in the fishery (4-7 
countries) positively affected ATD. As before, per capita fish consumption above a 
certain value (23.8 kg/year) increased the agreed TACs. Relatively low 
unemployment rates of 5.3-9.4% decrease the difference between advise and agreed 
TACs, while for values >9.4% a clear positive effect was found.  
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Fig. 4. Partial effects of socio-ecological-economic factors in the second Generalized 
additive model (GAM) controlling for stock size, explaining the deviation between advised 
and agreed TACs. The solid lines represent the estimated smooth function and the dashed 
lines the corresponding 95% confidence limits. The rug plots along the x-axis show the 
values of the covariates for each smooth and the number in each y-axis caption is the 
effective degrees of freedom of each term. From left to right and from top to bottom: number 
of countries (a), per capita fish consumption (b, kg/year), unemployment rate (c, %).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper shows that political overfishing has been and still is a serious problem in 
the European Common Fisheries Policy.  
 
In the European Union, TACs are set by the Council of Minsters which consists of 
national representatives of the EU member states. The European Commission 
usually develops a proposal for TACs based on scientific recommendations from the 
ICES and hands it over the Council of Ministers. Regarding the TAC, the ministers 
have the final say. For the majority of the stocks is it evident that the political 
decision-makers in the Council tend to ignore the scientific advice and set TACs to 
levels greater than the scientific recommendation. 
In our analysis we identify four factors that influence the gap between TACs and 
scientific advice.  
The first finding is that political overfishing increases with the stock size. It could be 
argued that from the decision-makers point of view a large stock does not seem to be 
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endangered and therefore does not need a sustainable, i.e. restrictive, TAC. As a 
consequence, the scientific advice is not sufficiently considered.  
The number of countries also affects the gap between TAC and scientific advice. The 
more countries fish for a stock the greater the deviation. If many countries have 
fishing interests in a specific stock the pressure on decision-makers to enforce high 
TACs for that stock increases. This fits with the findings of McWhinnie (2009) who 
states that stocks fished by a large number of countries are more likely to be 
overexploited than stocks fished by a small number of countries.  
The level of fish consumption and the unemployment rate also have the potential to 
increase the gap between TACs and advice if they reach sufficiently large values. If 
the level of fish consumption (per capita and year) exceeds 23.8kg it clearly 
increases the deviation between TAC and advice. The same holds for an 
unemployment rate of more than 9,4%.  
It can be assumed that a high level of fish consumption of a country indicates 
importance of fishery for the population, e.g. for historic or cultural as well as for 
economic reasons. Hence, countries with a higher fish consumption will have a 
greater interest in high TACs and therefore are more likely to ignore the scientific 
advice when it comes to TAC decisions. 
If the unemployment rate is sufficiently high a country will put more effort on avoiding 
a further increase in unemployment. Since employment in the fishing sector is 
decreasing all over Europe people working in that sector are prone to unemployment. 
By arguing for high TACs countries (or their national representative on EU level) can 
increase the probability of fishermen to stay employed. 
We conclude that socio-economic variables have an important influence on the TAC 
level. So far, this kind of factors is not considered in the development of the scientific 
advice. In order to implement a more successful ecosystem-based fishery 
management in the European Union it will be necessary to include socio-economic 
factors more explicitly, i.e. on a regular scientific basis, in the future. Otherwise, 
fisheries management will be strongly influenced by in-transparent, personal, and in 
the worst case bad-informed opinions, and not based on science. 
 
 
